INCOME CONCENTRATION, DEMOCRACY INSTABILITY AND ECONOMIC GROWTH

Tonis, Alexander; Popov, Vladimir V.; Polterovich, Victor

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INCOME CONCENTRATION, DEMOCRACY INSTABILITY AND ECONOMIC GROWTH

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INCOME CONCENTRATION, DEMOCRACY INSTABILITY AND ECONOMIC GROWTH

Annotation

PII

S042473880000616-6-1

Publication type

Article

Status

Published

Authors

Alexander Tonis Send message Vladimir V. Popov

ORCID: 0000-0001-5299-958X

Victor Polterovich

Edition

Issue №1

Pages

15-29

Abstract

In the works (Polterovich, Popov, 2007; Polterovich, Popov, Tonis, 2007, 2008), it was established that when the quality of institutions is low, democratization negatively affects economicgrowth; some mechanisms of this influence were studied. The article provides an overviewof the relevant results and explores another mechanism related to income distribution.Based on econometric calculations, it is shown that with imperfect institutions,democratization and an increase in resource wealth are associated with an increase in inequality, which increases the level of inequality.instability of democracy. And the instability of the political regime, in turn, leads to adeterioration in the quality of institutions and negatively affects the growth rate. Empirical observationsare explained in the framework of a game-theoretic model that demonstrates the instability ofdemocracy with weak institutions and a high concentration of income.

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Date of publication

01.01.2009

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997

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GOST	Polterovich V., Popov V., Tonis A. INCOME CONCENTRATION, DEMOCRACY INSTABILITY AND ECONOMIC GROWTH // Economics and the Mathematical Methods. – 2009. – Issue №1 C. 15-29 .
MLA	Polterovich, Victor, Popov, Vladimir V, Tonis, Alexander "INCOME CONCENTRATION, DEMOCRACY INSTABILITY AND ECONOMIC GROWTH." Economics and the Mathematical Methods. 1 (2009).:15-29.
APA	Polterovich V., Popov V., Tonis A. (2009). INCOME CONCENTRATION, DEMOCRACY INSTABILITY AND ECONOMIC GROWTH. Economics and the Mathematical Methods. no. 1, pp.15-29


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