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PUBLIC CHOICE PROCEDURES OF A LINEAR BUDGET AND TAX STRUCTURE
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PUBLIC CHOICE PROCEDURES OF A LINEAR BUDGET AND TAX STRUCTURE
Annotation
PII
S042473880000616-6-1
Publication type
Article
Status
Published
Authors
Sergei Graborov 
Edition
Volume 49 Issue 2
Pages
71-86
Abstract

The choice of the best budget and tax structure has been realized by means of unification of the objective functions of the voters. This structure is optimized in a framework of a multiproduct economy with the taxes on property, income and consumption. A generation of a steady voting union including “pure” employees and transfers recipients has been proved at a number of conditions. A budget and tax task has been formulated; its optimal decision ensures maximization of an after tax income for every member of this formation.

Keywords
public choice, optimization, budget and tax structure, unifi cation, majority voting
Date of publication
01.04.2013
Number of purchasers
1
Views
850
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