OPTIMAL HIERARCHIES OF CONTROL IN ECONOMIC SYSTEMS
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OPTIMAL HIERARCHIES OF CONTROL IN ECONOMIC SYSTEMS
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PII
S042473880000616-6-1
Publication type
Article
Status
Published
Authors
Sergei Mishin 
Edition
Pages
85-101
Abstract
We study a mathematical model for optimizing the management hierarchy, where the cost function is defined on a set of hierarchies that includes not only trees, but also more complex structures with multiple subordination. The problem of optimal hierarchy for different classes of the cost function is solved. examples of cost functions for several types of interaction between superiors and subordinates in the hierarchy are considered.
Date of publication
01.07.2007
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