MODEL OF INTERACTION BETWEEN THE PRINCIPAL AND AGENTS WITH DIFFERENT ATTITUDES TO RISK
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MODEL OF INTERACTION BETWEEN THE PRINCIPAL AND AGENTS WITH DIFFERENT ATTITUDES TO RISK
Annotation
PII
S042473880000616-6-1
Publication type
Article
Status
Published
Authors
S Kondrashin 
Edition
Pages
63-73
Abstract
A model of interaction between the principal and agents (Arrow, 1985; Coase, 1937) with different attitudes to risk in one, two, or more periods is described. The optimal strategy of the principal's behavior is analyzed depending on the agents ' attitude to risk, the duration of interaction, the factor of discounting future gains/losses, and other parameters.
Date of publication
01.07.2007
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81
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