MARKET STRUCTURING AS AN INSTRUMENT OF THE STATE INDUSTRIAL POLICY
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MARKET STRUCTURING AS AN INSTRUMENT OF THE STATE INDUSTRIAL POLICY
Annotation
PII
S042473880000616-6-1
Publication type
Article
Status
Published
Authors
Georgy Kolesnik
Nikolay Shvets
Edition
Pages
85-95
Abstract

One of the instruments of market competition regulation is the formation of a hierarchical structure of producers by providing some of them with the preferential terms of business. In addition to changes in market prices, the sale of privileges to producers allows consumer to extract additional income. The authors study the impact of the privileges in the form of long-term agreements on the market equilibrium and consumer surplus. It is shown that long-term agreements are effective for consumer at the markets with а small number of participants. The infl uence of transaction costs on the optimal market contracting structure is analyzed.

Keywords
competition, market, privileges, welfare, hierarchical system, regulation, industrial policy, procurement activity, long-term agreement, import substitution
Date of publication
01.10.2015
Number of purchasers
0
Views
91
1

## References

Avdasheva S., Kudrin A. (2013). Zadachi torgovykh politik chastnykh kompanij kak instrumenta regulirovaniya i razvitiya konkurentsii: mirovoj opyt i popytka prognoza // Ehkonomicheskaya politika. № 5. S. 106–126.
Burguet R., Perry M. (2009). Preferred Suppliers in Auction Markets // RAND Journal of Economics. Vol. 40. No 2. P. 283–295.