MAXIMIZATION OF THE COLLECTIVE WEALTH AND THE DISTRIBUTED PROPERTY RIGHTS
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MAXIMIZATION OF THE COLLECTIVE WEALTH AND THE DISTRIBUTED PROPERTY RIGHTS
Annotation
PII
S042473880000616-6-1
Publication type
Article
Status
Published
Authors
Georgy Kolesnik 
Pages
40-50
Abstract

The author considers economic systems with the property rights distributed among several agents. It is shown that outside interests of the owners make management strategies dependent on the property rights allocation. Unfortunate (Ineffective) initial allocation together with the barriers on re-allocation leads to management inefficiency.

Keywords
property rights, confl ict of interests, welfare, effi ciency, competition, oligopoly
Date of publication
01.04.2012
Number of purchasers
0
Views
81
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References



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